Reform must continue in military, police Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge  ;   An Arryman Scholar and a visiting scholar at the Buffet Center for International and Comparative Studies, Northwestern University, in Evanston, Illinois, US

JAKARTA POST,  17 Desember 2014

                                                                                                                       

The deadly clashes between the police’s mobile brigade (Brimob) and Indonesian Military (TNI) personnel have proliferated. The recent case that took place in Batam, Riau Islands, depicts the high friction between these two state agencies that were separated in 1999, a year after the downfall of Soeharto. These agencies have been complicit in a conflict that has repeated itself annually, with different causes, for almost two decades. They have functioned as actors of violence rather than the managers of violence under the democratic state. Two mainstream explanations for the most recent clash are access to economic resources and the organizational problem that led the TNI personnel to deceive the chain of command. However, these two reasons are part of the structural, institutional and agency factors related to security apparatus under a democracy. At the structural level, the security agencies had to deal with instability in regimes, particularly shortly after Soeharto resigned in 1998. The economic downturn and political instability led to regional conflicts, while Indonesia had to struggle as one united country. The country also faced terrorism, notably the Bali suicide bombings in 2002 and 2005. These problems encouraged the security apparatus to be more active in domestic security. During the 10 years after retired general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became president in 2004, the regime still had to deal with terrorism, but generally Indonesia became a more stable country. At the institutional level, the state security agencies struggled to adapt to the above structural condition. Against distrust of the military, the police was split from the TNI in April 1999 after 30 years of being together. The aim was to make the police force less military and more professional and focused mainly on internal security. Yudhoyono’s presidency also marked a key cornerstone of military reform. He was one of the reform-minded generals in the waning days of Soeharto who appointed the civilian Juwono Sudarsono as defense minister to manage security and defense issues. Initially, the government passed the 2004 law on the TNI, followed by significant endeavors in military reform. The focus of the efforts was structural reform, by dismissing all politically related bodies within the military and placing the TNI under the defense minister. Another was cultural reform, by introducing human rights and democratic civilian control, to be taught at every level of military education. All these efforts were expected to totally change the military political character to professionalize the military and put civilian control over it. However there was no strong political will to continue military reform during Yudhoyono’s second term. Institutional problems have remained in place, such as difficulties in managing military-run businesses and human rights abuses. In contrast, the police have not had any internal reform initiatives since 1999. With no ministry supervision, the police have become more independent and powerful. There is also no strong political commitment to reform and provide oversight of the police. The police have also misused their power in many ways. It has become the most corrupt institution, with a Transparency International score of 91 percent, followed by the legislature at 86 percent in 2013. This description reflects the predatory policing character that is still pervasive. Additionally, the police have gradually increased their militaristic style in dealing with civilian protests. Cases include officers beating elderly women in Rembang, Central Java, in a peaceful protest against land grabbing. Another example is when the East Nusa Tenggara Police criminalized Rudi Soik, one of its own officers, after Rudi investigated some senior officers in a human trafficking case. All these structural and institutional problems have a significant influence at the agency level. Accordingly, military and police officers have seen each other as competitors rather than as a united security forces. The military sees its “younger brother” as taking its privilege in dealing with domestic security issues. During my research in three army territorial commands across Java, some officers expressed dislike and jealousy toward the police force. “The police officers frequently ask for military assistance to track terrorism networks, and yet rarely admit it publicly,” a middle-ranking officer once said. Some retired officers dislike suggestion of the military’s role in the conflicts between the two institutions. “We are done with our reform, how about them?” said one former three-star military general. In contrast, some police officers argue that the military should not be jealous of them. Constitutionally, the military only deals with security issues when higher civilian authorities request them to back up the police. Instead, the military is responsible merely for defense issues. Domestic security issues, however, are also related to the predatory economic activities of the security apparatus, leading to a long-lasting power struggle between the two agencies. Therefore the initial effort of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo to meet and hold discussions with senior ranking officers from both security apparatuses is commendable, but insufficient to tackle all the problems. Apparently, Jokowi supports TNI’s transformation. The idea of changing military reform to defense transformation is highly praised. However, this idea is at odds with the real condition at some military commands. For instance, some scholars propose the building of a respectable defense force in Asia equipped with billion-dollar weapons, yet some lower-ranking officers are still unable to afford a worthy school for their children, even after spending 20 years preparing to become a soldier. The case of Batam is another example of the ambitious and elitist idea of “transformation”, while some fundamental problems remain unresolved at the grassroots level. Jokowi has to show strong political will and take firm measures to review all security approaches. Urgent measures include, first, re-asses the act of the National Security Council under the presidency’s oversight. This council should comprise all security and defense stakeholders, plus related NGOs ranging from security to human rights groups, on the selected committee boards. These various actors can discuss how to assess threats and determine appropriate integrated security and defense policies. The second measure is putting the police under ministry oversight. A ministry is not only the symbol of civilian democratic control; its oversight would be needed to create transparency and accountability within the police, which has long resisted external supervision. The third is reviewing TNI’s stalled reform, though Jokowi will certainly face some conservative generals, including those in his own camp. He has to prove a tough president given his constitutional right to govern and initiate policies without any pressure whatsoever from powerful figures. ●