Rohingya crisis : Redux Avyanthi Azis  ;   The writer spent a year with the displaced Rohingya population in Malaysia; She teaches at the department of international relations, University of Indonesia

JAKARTA POST, 20 Mei 2015

                                                                                                                                                           

                                                                                                                                                           

The current crisis involving Rohingya boat people evokes a sense of déjà vu. News of the humanitarian emergency is in fact not new. From the end of 2008 to early 2009 we saw the same images unfolding: boats carrying the stateless fleeing persecution were not welcomed anywhere in the region. Then Thai PM Abhisit Vejjajiva had declared the crisis a “regional problem”. There was a similar call for Southeast Asian countries to address the issue. Six years later, what does a repeat of the event suggest? First, there is a crucial need to rethink our notion of “crisis”. Emergencies seem to occur only when boundaries are crossed: The Rohingya predicament mostly comes to attention when they move across borders. The crisis comes in episodes despite the Rohingya’s statelessness being permanent. Their disorderly movement disturbs us more than their dire plight. Those who follow events in Myanmar can easily discern the real crisis in the series of discriminatory and Rohingya-effacing policies that the state enforces, for instance, Myanmar’s Citizenship Law, the series of mass expulsions, the way in which Rohingya must list themselves as Bengali for the census. All this suggests that hellish human conditions are acceptable when confined within borders. Second, it is misleading to present the Rohingya’s predicament as humanitarian. It is a political problem: Myanmar has never pretended otherwise. It is particularly not helpful to mix religion with the issue. On the contrary, it is potentially harmful. This is not to advocate godlessness — but the Rohingya have to be understood, first and foremost, through their statelessness. It is a problem rooted in the national order. Failure of this system is particularly highlighted in how the crisis has been allowed to become routine. As a predicament, statelessness can befall people of any religion. The current crisis is actually reminiscent of the fate of European Jews during the Nazi era — the Southeast Asian maritime ping-pong of today finds an Atlantic precedent in the MS St. Louis’ “voyage of the damned”. Of course, calls to religious solidarity appeal to the moral higher ground. However, charity and alms can only last a certain, limited period.  The Rohingya issue is essentially a tragedy of the world of nation-states. It cannot be remedied by non-state actors. Statelessness is not just “lack of”, it is also “exclusion from” citizenship. Most Rohingya I have spoken to describe themselves as a football, “kicked around everywhere”. Once a person is stripped of nationality, he or she will be denied that everywhere. Eventually, space for humans can only be provided by the state. This is the basic gist of prevailing norms of citizenship. Third, only the state can provide a durable solution for the Rohingya. This simple message strangely needs a lot of repeating. That it was marginalized groups like fishermen who were more ready to lend a hand to the Rohingya ought to put governments to shame. The prolonged neglect of Rohingya has often been attributed to ASEAN’s non-interference principle: The Rohingya issue is a domestic issue for Myanmar to solve. However, it has ceased to be that way for a while now. There are stranded Rohingya everywhere across the region. Most Southeast Asian nations now host displaced Rohingya. Both Thailand and Malaysia have hosted sizable Rohingya populations for decades. Their protracted refugeehood implies that emergencies do last beyond the temporary. If Abhisit’s call rang hollow once, it should resonate deeply by now. The crisis is permanent; the emergency is no longer domestic. It is imperative for Southeast Asian governments to act upon it. We are in fact already a few decades late. Allegedly, former president Soeharto had once thought of solving the Rohingya issue back in the 1980s. The plan was scratched out as his government chose to focus on the Cambodian peace process. It better served the Cold War geopolitics of the time. Are we thus only interested in the plight of a people if it serves our interests? Do we only help refugees when they can be used strategically? So far, states in the region have tended to redirect Rohingya boats to other countries aside from Myanmar. Do we read this as a nod to the “non-refoulement” international principle protecting refugees against being returned to the places where they lived in fear — or persisting reluctance to engage Myanmar directly? The fact that talks are proposed among affected countries suggests the latter. One thing that differentiates the current episode from 2008/2009 is that the country of origin has now opened up itself to reforms. How do Myanmar’s neighbors factor the Rohingya issue into their efforts to reintegrate Myanmar? Does engagement entail mainly elitist, market-oriented interests? Does regional integration involve only the states — where are the people in all this? Are the Rohingya within the Southeast Asian imagination at all? And then — where does Indonesia’s current administration stand? The crisis is occurring at sea. Where do boat people fit in Indonesia’s sophisticated conception of maritime security? Is it people-oriented at all? We need to start answering these questions because we will see more migration-related crises in the future. The Rohingya issue is not the only one. The recent case in Benjina, Maluku, which exposed the slavery of foreign fishermen, was an example of another regional problem pertaining to population movements. With regard to migrants, are we concerned only with our own? Indonesia has increasingly found itself as a transit country; ultimately, we will become a host country as well — we already are, to a certain extent. And we need a people-centric framework that can humanely respond to these challenges. ●