A
Hamas representative officce in Jakarta
should
pose no dilemma
Fahlesa Munabari ; The writer, a lecturer in international
relations at Budi Luhur University, Jakarta, is an Australian Endeavour Award
Scholar
at the University of New South Wales
|
JAKARTA
POST, 15 Desember 2014
Recent
attempts by Hamas to open an office in Jakarta have ended in vain, despite
strong support from the House of Representatives.
Amid
divergent public opinions on this issue, the Foreign Ministry eventually made
it clear that despite Indonesia’s unwavering support for the independence of
Palestine, it only recognized the Palestine government, not its political
factions.
This
government’s view contradicts that of some community leaders and House
politicians who argue that, in Indonesia, Hamas should be given the same
political opportunity as the ruling Fatah faction and that the former takes
different approaches to appreciating Palestinian fighters from the latter.
Many
would agree that the prolonged suffering of the Gaza people is due to the
Israeli government’s ongoing blockade of Gaza, which has drawn considerable
international support and humanitarian assistance in favor of Gaza.
In
Indonesia, it is not uncommon that the Gaza people’s cries for help spark
condemnations of Israel’s grave violations of international law, including
war crimes and crimes against humanity.
But for
some parties and communities in this most populous Muslim-majority country,
the expressions of sympathy and support for this suffering are not only aimed
at the people of Gaza, but also at Hamas.
This
faction has transformed into a popular symbol of resistance against the
Israeli government among many Muslim communities around the world, including
Indonesia, since it emerged during the first intifada in 1987.
In it
own eyes, the faction epitomizes the humble yet valiant David, the shepherd
boy in the old Biblical story who managed to defeat the giant Goliath with
nothing more than a sling and a stone.
In light
of Israel’s unending oppression in Gaza, particularly since tougher sanctions
were imposed on Gaza following Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006, the humble
and heroic image of Hamas remains strong among these communities, far
surpassing the image of the Fatah faction in the West Bank. This explains the
strong support for Hamas’ intention to open an office in Jakarta.
Hamas’
efforts to court political support from the Indonesian authorities should
come as no surprise given that the faction is in dire need of galvanizing as
much international support as possible, not only for easing Israel’s
prolonged blockade of Gaza, but also for achieving an independent state for
the Palestinian people in Palestine.
Nevertheless,
from the perspective of Indonesia’s foreign policy, Hamas’ intention to open
a representative office in Jakarta is, alas, not free of problems.
There
are at least two reasons why the establishment of a Hamas office in the
country at best should not be expected, and the ministry’s decision to deny
Hamas’ request is anything but unsound. This is not to say that Indonesia’s
commitment to the Palestinians’ quest for a free and independent Palestinian
state is faltering. Far from it.
First,
the request was problematic because it was made amid heightened tensions
between Hamas and Fatah following the end of the six-month Palestinian unity
government’s mandate, which recently expired.
The
Palestinian unity government was formed on June 2 as a result of a
Hamas-Fatah agreement signed a few months earlier on April 24, with a view to
forging a common political vision and ending the two factions’ protracted
conflict in the Israeli-occupied territories.
This was
lauded by many as an important milestone in the history of Hamas-Fatah
rivalry in Palestine.
Yet
reconciliation between the two factions is too fragile to serve as a genuine
foundation for an enduring joint political platform in Palestine’s political
milieu.
The
recent dynamics of the political constellation in the Middle East have played
a part in the signing of this half-hearted agreement.
Then Gen.
Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s takeover of the democratically elected Mursi
government in Egypt last year is certainly a serious blow to Hamas. Since his
ascension to power, El-Sisi has closed virtually all tunnels along Egypt’s
border with Gaza, jeopardizing the very heart of Hamas’ logistical
infrastructure extremely vital to its overall activities.
Worse
still, the situation is exacerbated by the fact that Iran as a Shiite
majority country has significantly reduced its financial support of Hamas,
which is an unequivocally Sunni group, because of the faction’s support for
Sunni opposition fighters in Syria’s seemingly endless civil war.
In the
meantime, the Fatah-led government in the West Bank has been increasingly
frustrated with the uninterrupted expansion of Jewish settlements despite
Israel’s pledge to freeze them.
It is
this tough political backdrop that has led the two factions to attempt to
knit themselves together as part of efforts to mend their relations, but to
no avail.
Instead
of improving their relations, the leaderships of the two factions are
suffering from a trust deficit. There is nothing much the unity government
can do on the ground in Gaza because Hamas remains the de facto ruler of the
region despite its denials of running a “shadow government” there.
Further,
the unity government was tasked with preparing the presidential and
legislative elections within six months, yet there is no indication
whatsoever that they will be held any time soon, which is indicative of how
the trust deficit between the two factions has led to lingering political
deadlock in the region.
Second,
taking into account the political backdrop, denying Hamas’ request to open an
office in Jakarta constitutes a strategic option that will save Indonesia
from being dragged into the unnecessary and potentially destructive rivalry
between Hamas and Fatah.
One
might argue that had Indonesia accommodated Hamas’ request, the country would
have run the risk of throwing itself into an uneasy relationship with
Israeli’s powerful allies such as the US and the UK, owing to the fact that
Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization by these countries.
However,
this should never serve as the Indonesian authorities’ reason for such a
decision, because Indonesia has, in fact, bilaterally recognized Palestine
since 1988.
Since
then, the country, along with its civil society organizations, has
demonstrated its commitment to keeping the Palestinian cause alive through a
variety of means.
If the Foreign Ministry was to present the reason behind its decision,
then primary justification would be refraining from being dragged into the
Hamas-Fatah rivalry and encouraging them to keep working toward fully fledged
reconciliation for the attainment of Palestinian statehood. ●
|
Tidak ada komentar:
Posting Komentar