With
leak legislative support
comes
threat of ineffective govt
Ahmad Khoirul Umam ; A
senior researcher at the Paramadina Public Policy Institute in Jakarta, A PhD
candidate in politics at the School of Political Science and International
Studies, the University of Queensland, Australia
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JAKARTA
POST, 12 April 2014
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The
results of the quick counts have shown that the 2014 legislative election did
not produce a great victory for the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
(PDI-P). In the preliminary estimations, a number of polling agencies
mentioned that the PDI-P was only able to garner about 18 percent, very far
from its elites’ expectations of up to 30 percent. It did not even surpass
the Democratic Party’s achievements in the 2009 election of 20.85 percent.
Based on
the experience of the administration under President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, a lack of political support in the House of Representatives will
determine the quality and effectiveness of government. The stronger the
support, the more effective its performance. Conversely, the weaker the
support the more vulnerable the government is to instability and
ineffectiveness.
Recent
experience also shows that the electability of a presidential candidate would
be nothing without strong support from the legislature. Some researchers may
say that the current administration’s fundamental problem is in the
President’s unassertive leadership style. The scholar Greg Fealy stated that
during his second term, Yudhoyono’s leadership style became more cautious and
aloof, rather than reformist and risk-taking. This unassertive leadership
style potentially inhibits an effective government in running its programs
and development strategies, including priority in combating corruption within
governmental bodies.
Personality
could be among the determining factors that influence leadership quality. But
another factor is political support from the House of Representatives.
Although the ruling party may be politically aligned with other parties in
the legislature, the character of the coalition is relatively liquid,
temporary and influenced by short-term interests. This makes it difficult to
distinguish between pro-government political supporters and the opposition
since the pro-government parties also often attack and weaken government
policies, rather than protect them from the opposition.
Despite
their pledge to support the government, pro-government parties have not
allowed the President to control them through a permanent coalition. As a
result, the government has been powerless in the face of attacks at the
House, leading to infighting within the coalition. This what researchers
referred to as the anomaly of a presidential system.
The
liquid and fragile coalition also impacts on the cabinet. Ideally, cabinet
members should work together. They should complement each other when running
the government’s programs and policies. If they worked in tandem, ministers may
have set up a comprehensive road map to address the country’s problems. In
contrast, ministers from a partisan background tend to maintain loyalty to
their respective political parties rather than to the president.
Given
the weak political support of the ruling party, it has accommodated some
other party supporters into the Cabinet. Even though partisan ministers must
report to the president according to the Constitution, the president often
loses his control over the ministers. They are protected by their political
parties and their representatives at the House. Therefore, when the ministers
are allegedly involved in corruption, the president is constrained by his own
“accommodative politics”, leading to face-saving strategies to avoid
confrontation with political rivals, especially the non-reformist elements.
The 2014
legislative election seems to have produced a similar political configuration
to 2009. The PDI-P’s 19 percent share of the vote would not secure its move
to win Joko “Jokowi” Widodo as its presidential candidate, making a coalition
inevitable.
However,
that would be very risky; people would gradually realize that the Jokowi
effect is not as strong as previously imagined. Even if he did end up being
president, his administration would also highly depend on the parties
supporting the coalition. With the slight difference in votes compared to its
rivals, the PDI-P would almost certainly find an effective permanent
coalition in the House difficult. Since our parties’ political behavior has shifted
from ideology-based to “radical pragmatism”, through negotiations and
compromises, the character of the next coalition would be similar to the
current administration, which is liquid, temporary and strongly influenced by
short-term interests.
If that
happens, the 2014 election will merely produce a politically weak reformist
government again, where the government’s performance will frequently be
disrupted by political maneuvers in the House, either through attacks from
the opposition or defiance from the coalition parties. The situation could
potentially trap the country in a longer democratic transition marked with
intensive interaction, confrontation, competition and compromising interests
among apparatus, politicians and others, constraining efforts at good
governance.
Vested
interest groups would have considerable opportunity to isolate and neutralize
weak reformers though political tactics or by criminalizing or bullying
reformist actors, even driving them out of their government positions. The
bullied and defeated reformers may embolden the vested interests opposed to
reform prospects with the help of a mutually supportive network of collusive
relationships between officials, politicians and businesspeople.
In such
situations, the ruling political party’s power and capability to protect the
government from political rivals will be tested. Their integrity and
proficiency in succeeding the government’s programs and public policies will
determine the success and failure of the next government. Conversely, if the
government remains weak in dealing with the vested interests, either from the
opposition or the internal coalition, Indonesia will take a much longer time
to consolidate its elements to achieve a substantive democracy — rather than
a merely procedural and symbolic democracy. ●
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