A lesson from Egypt myth of religious violence

A lesson from Egypt myth of religious violence Khairil Azhar ;  A Researcher at the Paramadina Foundation and Ciputat School for Democratic Islam

JAKARTA POST, 21 Desember 2012

  

Watching and reading news on the current political fraud in Egypt, we might simply conclude that it is because of religion. The unrest has been blamed on the political decisions of the Muslim Brotherhood after it won the national election. With their inclination to the righter part of the Islamic continuum, Muslim Brotherhood figures in the government and legislature have been alleged to have manipulated many things, especially the sharia-oriented policies, unfair upward political mobility of its figures and so on. Simply said, they have betrayed the spirit of the people’s movement centered at Tahrir Square a year ago. Instead of materializing “tahrir” (meaning “liberation”), they keep trying to enact what they say are Islamic rules and orders that actually repudiate the liberty of the people. Looking back at several years before the Egyptian Revolution, there was actually an acute contestation between factions in the society. The triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood was then an example of how toothless civil society was. In his analysis of the ripening circumstances of Egypt’s revolution a couple of years before it took place, Sheri Berman (2003) defined civil society loosely as “all voluntary institutions and associations that exist below the level of the state, but above the level of family: churches, clubs, civic groups, professional organizations, NGOs and so forth”.  Civil society is believed to be “both an indicator of and a prerequisite for a healthy democracy and society.” Using this broad definition, Sheri dialectically explained the one-sided contestation between social institutions and associations established by radical Muslims against liberal ones, which in actuality, must have been backed by the secular Egyptian state. She convincingly writes, “Blocked from full political participation and allowed much greater freedom in civil society, the Islamist movements set about Islamizing Egypt from below.” Right now, after winning the election, we could further conclude using this logic that the Islamists are now trying to consolidate themselves with any possible ways. Yet, looking at the things competed for by both civil society and Islamists, which actually are the political and economic resources for the sake of the actors themselves and their groups, can we say that they really contend for merely religious purposes? Is not that talking about political and economic accesses and assets are related to something secular, where religion only plays a manipulated-symbolic role? Consequently, are the subsequent conflicts and violence not very secular in nature too? William T. Cavanaugh (2009) writes that “religious violence” is a myth. Violence — whether it is the consequence of tension between persons or groups in society or not — is whatsoever caused by human beings. Violence can happen due to many reasons.  We can therefore say that the conflicts in the Middle East, with the intermittent violence, happened due to oil, political fraud or other secular causes. Religion might actually only play a minor, much less than the significant we usually attribute to it.  The myth of religious violence, according to Cavanaugh, is a consequence of the modern, Western mind. A modern state, as it is defined in that mind, must sideline the role of religion to make it the dominant player because religion is believed to be able to cause something as big as cosmic war. The modern-western perspective has then influenced the way most academic works and policies look at conflicts and violence they produce. One of the best examples is the way the Crusades have so far been defined. Following Cavanaugh, looking at the violent history of the Crusades, we can question, “Were the Crusaders or Muslims in the middle age really fighting for religious purposes?” Back to the case in Egypt, we can ask the same question and come to the same conclusion. The use of religious symbols by the Muslim Brotherhood is nothing more than a tactic. In addition, to a certain extent, the media, pundits or political leaders saying that what is going on in Egypt is a kind of religious conflict, is also a mistake. Regardless of any criticism on Cavanaugh’s thesis, this reorientation of the way we look at conflicts or violence is important in order to position our perspectives properly. We can also therefore help ourselves by looking at religions more positively, if not, look at it as a potential medium to solve violent societal conflicts that have occurred. ●