Concert of Asia
needs more than two big players
(Part 2 of 2)
|
Sabam Siagian dan Endy Bayuni ; The writers
are senior editors of The Jakarta Post and former editors-in-chief of the
newspaper. They are Class 1979 and Class 2004 of the Nieman Fellowship
program for journalists at Harvard University.
Siagian was
formerly Indonesia’s ambassador to Australia
|
JAKARTA
POST, 30 Agustus 2012
The East Asia Summit (EAS), an
ASEAN initiative, is still in its infancy, but the admission of the United
States and Russia last year raises hopes that countries in the region are
seriously looking into all the issues, including peace and security, which
challenge the region.
A more relevant point of reference or model for the EAS to emulate is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), rather than the Concert of Vienna or the bilateral talks that took place between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Granted, East Asia has many security challenges, some of which are only coming to the surface now as China begins to flex its muscles, but this is no reason to throw in the towel and let the big boys take care of the problems.
The solid foundation of ASEAN’s centrality is the unity of its 10 members. Since ASEAN’s durable cohesion is the essence to maintaining a secure geopolitical environment for the archipelagic Republic of Indonesia, it is Jakarta’s task to cajole and push fellow ASEAN members to solve or manage their bilateral problems amicably, including the remaining problems of overlapping territorial claims.
Jakarta should keep hammering the message to other members that their national interests will be better served by upholding ASEAN loyalty and adhering to the accepted ASEAN way of solving problems amicably.
ASEAN should not to be swayed by the promised assistance of outside powers.
The recent tension in the South China Sea, where China and a number of Southeast Asian countries have overlapping territorial claims, is an Achilles Heel for ASEAN, with Cambodia allying itself with China, while the Philippines and Vietnam are turning to the United States.
Having read White’s book and analysis, it is all the more important for the EAS, in which ASEAN centrality has been widely accepted, to succeed and to keep Asia from becoming polarized into two contesting camps for the good of the region and its people and keep the Asian Century on the right track.
Ways must be found — and Indonesia should play a leading role in this effort — to enhance the efficacy of the EAS. When the two great powers, each from opposite sides of the Pacific and with their contrasting historical experiences, engage in the painful give-and-take process toward a fine-tuned power-sharing agreement that unavoidably involves the need for face saving, an effective EAS could provide the ideal setting to manage egos, perceived losses of prestige and the resulting domestic backlash.
It would be asking too much of the two great powers’ rationality to expect that they would come up with an agreed formula for power sharing. After all, China’s determination to overcome and erase the lingering traces of a “century of national humiliation” and America’s faithful adherence to its concept of “Manifest Destiny” could entice them into a collision course.
The EAS provides the ideal setting for the two great powers to hammer out a power-sharing deal, while the rest of the nations in attendance can act as more than mere onlookers.
A unified ASEAN, with a combined GDP of US$2 trillion and the strategic sea lanes of communication, poses a potentially large source of nuisance and will not automatically submit itself to any agreed-upon power-sharing formula that does not take into account its interests.
White describes Taiwan as a major potential flashpoint, arguing that how China and America deal with this issue and how each sees the “status of China” will be a critical index of their respective places in Asia’s power structure.
Pointing out that the US will bear the high cost of waging war with China to preserve Taiwan, he also argues that America can no longer prevent China from seizing Taiwan by force.
He portends that “Taiwan has for a long time seemed to pose the greatest risk, and it remains quite possible that developments in the cross strait relationship could induce a crisis with very serious consequences.”
White’s alarming projection overlooks the dramatic improvements currently taking place in the cross strait relationship. We think that China is no longer willing to pay the high cost of seizing Taiwan by force where non-force approaches have started bearing fruit.
The historic Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by Beijing and Taipei in 2010 covers an array of activities, such as direct flight and shipping connections, people’s movements, customs and quarantine procedures, and joint police operations to prevent smuggling. The ECFA is constantly being updated with new attachments to the original 16 agreements, such as the recent deal on investment protection.
The number of people crossing the straits by sea between China’s Fujian province and Taiwan has tripled to more than 90,000 in the first seven months of 2012 since the launching of new express passenger liner at the start of the year, according to a recent report in the China Daily.
When an Indonesian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) delegation visited Taipei in June, they were informed by the Strait Exchange Foundation that 1.8 million people from the mainland had visited Taiwan in 2011.
The chairman of this semi-official agency, Pin Kung-Chiang, a distinguished elderly gentleman who enjoys de facto cabinet member status, indirectly told the delegation that he was in regular contact with important members of the Politburo’s Standing Committee in Beijing.
Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou is upbeat about the prospects of stronger ties. In his inaugural speech in May at the start of his second, and last, four-year term, he said the ECFA had made cross strait rapprochement a reality by improving relations, reducing tensions and bringing peace and prosperity. He added: “In the next four years, the two sides of the straits have to open up new areas of cooperation and continue working to consolidate peace, expand prosperity and deepen mutual trust.”
If the Taiwan problem is losing its sexiness as a flashpoint, the recent confrontations between Japan’s naval patrol boats and Chinese armed fishery vessels in Northeast Asia over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and between Chinese and the Philippines government ships in the South China Sea over the Scarborough/Huayang shoal have produced two new emerging flashpoints.
These two new flashpoints are potentially quite dangerous. Japan and the Philippines are formal allies of the United States, which could be sucked into a contentious crisis with China.
Although an important read for Asian policymakers, White wrote The China Choice with American readers very much in mind. The book’s conclusion and recommendations are all directed at Washington.
White even wrote the last chapter of the book as a draft speech for the American president to deliver to his fellow Americans, in recognizing and accommodating China’s hegemonic ambitions, but without completely giving up America’s primacy in Asia.
Of course, come the US presidential election in November, things may change completely. In the event of a Republican victory for challenger Mitt Romney, the new administration is unlikely to go for White’s carefully crafted third option of accommodating China.
In a recent New York Times opinion article, globalist Roger Cohen quoted Romney as saying about his foreign policy: “I do not view America as just one more point on the strategic map, one more power to be balanced. I believe our country is the greatest force for good the world has ever known.”
One may be tempted to ask in which century is Romney living — it certainly isn’t the Asian Century. If Romney does win in November, White will have to write another book, as the China Choice will have been made for him with America choosing to maintain its primacy at all costs. ●
A more relevant point of reference or model for the EAS to emulate is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), rather than the Concert of Vienna or the bilateral talks that took place between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Granted, East Asia has many security challenges, some of which are only coming to the surface now as China begins to flex its muscles, but this is no reason to throw in the towel and let the big boys take care of the problems.
The solid foundation of ASEAN’s centrality is the unity of its 10 members. Since ASEAN’s durable cohesion is the essence to maintaining a secure geopolitical environment for the archipelagic Republic of Indonesia, it is Jakarta’s task to cajole and push fellow ASEAN members to solve or manage their bilateral problems amicably, including the remaining problems of overlapping territorial claims.
Jakarta should keep hammering the message to other members that their national interests will be better served by upholding ASEAN loyalty and adhering to the accepted ASEAN way of solving problems amicably.
ASEAN should not to be swayed by the promised assistance of outside powers.
The recent tension in the South China Sea, where China and a number of Southeast Asian countries have overlapping territorial claims, is an Achilles Heel for ASEAN, with Cambodia allying itself with China, while the Philippines and Vietnam are turning to the United States.
Having read White’s book and analysis, it is all the more important for the EAS, in which ASEAN centrality has been widely accepted, to succeed and to keep Asia from becoming polarized into two contesting camps for the good of the region and its people and keep the Asian Century on the right track.
Ways must be found — and Indonesia should play a leading role in this effort — to enhance the efficacy of the EAS. When the two great powers, each from opposite sides of the Pacific and with their contrasting historical experiences, engage in the painful give-and-take process toward a fine-tuned power-sharing agreement that unavoidably involves the need for face saving, an effective EAS could provide the ideal setting to manage egos, perceived losses of prestige and the resulting domestic backlash.
It would be asking too much of the two great powers’ rationality to expect that they would come up with an agreed formula for power sharing. After all, China’s determination to overcome and erase the lingering traces of a “century of national humiliation” and America’s faithful adherence to its concept of “Manifest Destiny” could entice them into a collision course.
The EAS provides the ideal setting for the two great powers to hammer out a power-sharing deal, while the rest of the nations in attendance can act as more than mere onlookers.
A unified ASEAN, with a combined GDP of US$2 trillion and the strategic sea lanes of communication, poses a potentially large source of nuisance and will not automatically submit itself to any agreed-upon power-sharing formula that does not take into account its interests.
White describes Taiwan as a major potential flashpoint, arguing that how China and America deal with this issue and how each sees the “status of China” will be a critical index of their respective places in Asia’s power structure.
Pointing out that the US will bear the high cost of waging war with China to preserve Taiwan, he also argues that America can no longer prevent China from seizing Taiwan by force.
He portends that “Taiwan has for a long time seemed to pose the greatest risk, and it remains quite possible that developments in the cross strait relationship could induce a crisis with very serious consequences.”
White’s alarming projection overlooks the dramatic improvements currently taking place in the cross strait relationship. We think that China is no longer willing to pay the high cost of seizing Taiwan by force where non-force approaches have started bearing fruit.
The historic Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by Beijing and Taipei in 2010 covers an array of activities, such as direct flight and shipping connections, people’s movements, customs and quarantine procedures, and joint police operations to prevent smuggling. The ECFA is constantly being updated with new attachments to the original 16 agreements, such as the recent deal on investment protection.
The number of people crossing the straits by sea between China’s Fujian province and Taiwan has tripled to more than 90,000 in the first seven months of 2012 since the launching of new express passenger liner at the start of the year, according to a recent report in the China Daily.
When an Indonesian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) delegation visited Taipei in June, they were informed by the Strait Exchange Foundation that 1.8 million people from the mainland had visited Taiwan in 2011.
The chairman of this semi-official agency, Pin Kung-Chiang, a distinguished elderly gentleman who enjoys de facto cabinet member status, indirectly told the delegation that he was in regular contact with important members of the Politburo’s Standing Committee in Beijing.
Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou is upbeat about the prospects of stronger ties. In his inaugural speech in May at the start of his second, and last, four-year term, he said the ECFA had made cross strait rapprochement a reality by improving relations, reducing tensions and bringing peace and prosperity. He added: “In the next four years, the two sides of the straits have to open up new areas of cooperation and continue working to consolidate peace, expand prosperity and deepen mutual trust.”
If the Taiwan problem is losing its sexiness as a flashpoint, the recent confrontations between Japan’s naval patrol boats and Chinese armed fishery vessels in Northeast Asia over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and between Chinese and the Philippines government ships in the South China Sea over the Scarborough/Huayang shoal have produced two new emerging flashpoints.
These two new flashpoints are potentially quite dangerous. Japan and the Philippines are formal allies of the United States, which could be sucked into a contentious crisis with China.
Although an important read for Asian policymakers, White wrote The China Choice with American readers very much in mind. The book’s conclusion and recommendations are all directed at Washington.
White even wrote the last chapter of the book as a draft speech for the American president to deliver to his fellow Americans, in recognizing and accommodating China’s hegemonic ambitions, but without completely giving up America’s primacy in Asia.
Of course, come the US presidential election in November, things may change completely. In the event of a Republican victory for challenger Mitt Romney, the new administration is unlikely to go for White’s carefully crafted third option of accommodating China.
In a recent New York Times opinion article, globalist Roger Cohen quoted Romney as saying about his foreign policy: “I do not view America as just one more point on the strategic map, one more power to be balanced. I believe our country is the greatest force for good the world has ever known.”
One may be tempted to ask in which century is Romney living — it certainly isn’t the Asian Century. If Romney does win in November, White will have to write another book, as the China Choice will have been made for him with America choosing to maintain its primacy at all costs. ●
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